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ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis, we examine whether the Navy should maintain its current scope of 
search and rescue (SAR) resource employment or consider alternative ways to conduct 
SAR missions. Station SAR services are critical enablers to the generation of naval 
aviation force readiness; however, use of a multi-mission combat helicopter may not be 
the most economical method to deliver those services, particularly when balanced with an 
increasing fleet demand. 
 We analyzed existing fleet inventory, personnel, and operational demand data at 
Naval Air Station at Lemoore, CA. We considered several options to alleviate the 
demand placed on the inventory of helicopters within the squadron and developed three 
distinct courses of action: procuring different aircraft, changing the location for the base 
of operations, or maintaining the status quo. Our cost benefit analysis results show that 
procuring a different aircraft in order to make the MH-60S available for other missions is 
a rather costly option. While the status quo remains the most economical option for 
providing current SAR capabilities, to support efficient future SAR capabilities, we 
recommend relocating the base of operations to Salinas, CA. 
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The MH-60S is a naval multi-mission aircraft whose operational demand at sea 
increases while outpacing inventory. In order to meet operational requirements, naval 
leadership must identify cost-effective solutions for the utilization of MH-60s before 
shortages affect readiness of the fleet. Our sponsor (N98 – Air Warfare Division) identified 
among the SAR stations that operate the MH-60S the Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA, and 
Naval Air Weapon Station China Lake, CA, that form the focus of our study. Both SAR 
stations are within proximity of one another, have overlapping coverage and present unique 
topography considerations.  
To provide an effective recommendation, our group conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) for the SAR operations on each station. Our goal is to identify any potential 
cost savings in supporting current and future SAR capabilities at the Lemoore and China 
Lake Naval Air Stations while attempting to reduce operational demand on MH-60S.  
In our study, we use the CBA approach, which appraises desirability of a project 
by analyzing benefits and costs. In order to ensure a meaningful CBA, our study uses data 
from in-person visit to NAS Lemoore, CA, and from communications with civilian 
contractors, SAR leadership, NAS Lemoore leadership, and aircrew. Despite numerous 
attempts to engage with the SAR team from the Naval Air Station China Lake, CA, for 
understanding and data collection activities, the stakeholders at this location were not able 
to participate in our study. Therefore, we are not able to include SAR at China Lake in our 
in-depth analysis. This limited the scope of our CBA to one SAR station and reduced the 
overall course of SAR alternatives in these operating areas. 
The CBA approach used in this study presents how SAR is currently delivered at 
NAS Lemoore, identifies several feasible courses of action (COA) and conducts a detailed 
cost benefit comparison for each COA considered. COA determination is scaled from 
status quo (blend of military and civilian contractors), fully military operation, and full 
contract services by a privatized civilian firm. The first COA we investigate is to keep it 
status quo, but to move the SAR station in Lemoore, CA, to Salinas, CA, with a new 
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immediate superior in charge (ISIC). The second COA investigates the cost of replacing 
the MH60S with a commercial aircraft similar in capabilities, while personnel remain status 
quo. The third COA replaces the MH60S with another twin-engine commercial aircraft 
while personnel remain status quo. 
To validate the findings of our CBA, we conduct sensitivity analysis (SA) for each 
COA in order to determine how net benefits may change if parameters deviate from the 
initial value used in the analysis. Although monetary values seem the most appropriate 
when cutting back on certain operations, non-monetary values still have impact on the 
decision made. Non-monetary values can include aircraft capabilities and limitations, 
displacement of medical resources, local military community, and civilian community 
relations, 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our research questions are as follows: 
 Primary Questions 
What are the feasible alternatives to deliver the SAR capability at NAS Lemoore, 
CA, and NAWS China Lake, CA, given the pressures on fleet tactical aircraft? 
 Secondary Question 
Could outsourcing station SAR services yield cost savings? If so, what are the 
intended and unintended effects on manpower and aircraft distribution in both the short 
and longer run? 
What is a more cost-effective alternative for delivering Station SAR capability at 
each Naval Air Station (NPS & N98, 2018)? 
The findings from this cost benefit analysis provide an opportunity for naval 
leadership to consider enough in-depth documentation on the strengths and weakness of 




Limited U.S. Coast Guard SAR support in the overwater training areas (W-283, W-
285, and W-532), as depicted in Figure 1, is the primary driver for Navy SAR support at 
NAS Lemoore. Beginning in the fiscal year 2018, usage of these areas increased to approx. 
ten hours each day, M-F, and approximately seven hours on Saturday. In addition, the 
Lemoore Military Operating Area (MOA) and the restricted areas 2508 (R-2508) complex 
and associate MOAs (Foothill, Owens, Portersville, Isabella, and Bakersfield) are used 
continuously during airfield hours of operations (Department of Navy [DoN], 2019). 
 
Figure 1. Lemoore Operating Area 
To provide two-hour response SAR support in W areas, NAS Lemoore will 
preposition SAR helicopter and crew at an airfield near the coast—Salinas municipal 
airport, Monterey regional airport or another airport within 150 nm of the western corners 
of the areas. The SAR asset will be prepositioned for up to ten continuous hours each day, 
Monday–Friday, and seven hours on Saturday, or as coordinated with Commander, Strike 
Fighter Wing Pacific (COMSTRKFIGHTWINGPAC) via the bi-weekly range scheduling 
conference. After flight operations, NAS Lemoore will re-establish a two-hour SAR 
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response for the overland areas. When no overwater ops, set a two-hour alert for overland 
areas during field hours of operation or until last plane on deck. NAS Lemoore SAR 
aircraft, equipped with one internal auxiliary fuel tank, can reach a search area within 
approx. 150 nm in less than two hours of notification with approximately 25 minutes of 
endurance on station for SAR (DoN, 2019). 
Helicopter Sea Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet exercises admin, maintenance, and 
operational oversight support to aviation units operating MH-60S to ensure compliance 
with requirements such as aircraft material condition inspections, NATOPS unit 
evaluations, SAR unit evaluations, and expedition handling of maintenance supply support 
(DoN, 2019). 
Due to unique Navy mission requirements, the Navy augments the U.S. National 
SAR Plan with Navy SAR units at NAS Lemoore. These Navy SAR units will provide 
SAR capability to Naval Aviation tenants and visiting units at their respective installations. 
Analysis by both Collins and Williams in 2013, and Christensen and Sciberras in 2019, 
arrived at a similar conclusion that commercially Contracted Air Services (CAS) provides 
substantial cost savings while simultaneously providing improved the performance over 
current SAR platforms and affords the possibility of recapitalizing critical resources to 
Fleet warfighting units.  
However, due to the current limitations for night flights, overwater, by civilian 
companies is not possible for an all-contract option to service these needs. This is coming 
from the current companies that perform SAR duties in the AOR; however, in the future, 
it is possible for a contract company to fulfill the nighttime, overwater requirements.  
A. RESEARCH TOPIC WITH REGARD TO AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION 
AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
The U.S. Navy utilizes the MH-60S helicopter as its search and rescue platform. It 
is an airframe that can perform a multitude of missions, but the MH-60S excels over any 
other platform in the mission area of SAR. The MH-60S is sea-based on aircraft carriers, 
littoral combat ships, and amphibious ships where they perform SAR duties, plane guard 
duties for flight operations, and protection duties, amongst other tasks. In 2018, two 
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separate reports (NPS and N9) were conducted on the MH-60S, noting that the growing 
demand for this platform’s capabilities will soon outgrow the current inventory of aircraft. 
Simply put, there will soon not be enough MH-60S aircraft to perform all the duties needed 
by the fleet.  
NAS Lemoore is the Navy’s largest air base and home to 20 squadrons comprising 
175 F/A-18 Super Hornets. With the advancement of tactics, the fighter squadrons have 
had to increase the amount of flights in the warning area W-283, W-285, and W-532, 
approximately 90 miles to the west of Monterey, CA. The primary need for Navy SAR 
support at NAS Lemoore is the limited U.S. Coast Guard SAR support in the overwater 
training areas off the cost of California.  
The support requirements increased starting in 2018, with the usage of the over 
water operating areas growing to approximately ten hours each day of the work week and 
approximately seven hours Saturday. In addition, the Lemoore military operating areas 
(MOA) and the restricted areas 2508 (R-2508) complex and surrounding MOAs are used 
continuously during airfield hours of operations (DoN, 2019). The addition of F-35 aircraft 
stationed at NAS Lemoore will increase this support requirement dramatically. The need 
for the SAR support is already putting a strain on the personnel and the aircraft, how would 
affect the SAR unit within the next year? 
Throughout the years after the budget sequestration in 2013, naval aviation has had 
to continuously look to cut back on flight hours in each squadron along with the total cost 
per flight hour, whenever possible. This led to the topic of our thesis: looking at how to 
efficiently utilize the current inventory of these helicopters between fleet needs and ashore 
SAR duties, especially when the fleet requirements have the priority.  
In our thesis, we continued the CBA on Navy Search and Rescue units, but our 
focus was the SAR units at NAS Lemoore and NAWS China Lake. Due to various 
limitations and unique environment conditions, we could not perform our analysis in the 
same fashion as the previous theses. In order to get the most out of the fleet aircraft we had 
to ask: Was the best option to continue the status quo and hope that the increased workload 
would not strain the fleet any further, would it be better to use a different aircraft and return 
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the SAR MH-60Ss back to the fleet, or lastly, should the Navy use the current assets in a 
more efficient way as to extend the expected life of the airframe? A full-contractor COA 
was not a viable option at NAS Lemoore because of the unique over-water support that is 
needed.  
We found through our research that we were not able to save a considerable amount 
of money through our various COAs because of the contract SAR option was not in play. 
We found that we could save the most money by changing the mission set of the Lemoore 
SAR unit, which would cut the required flight hours by 50% a year. The current ISIC of 
NAS Lemoore SAR is CNIC. 
B. NATIONAL SAR PLAN 
Search and rescue are two functions that may have the same functions, but their 
objectives are different. Search is an operation to locate persons in distress. Rescue is an 
operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide medical needs, and deliver them to safety, 
as depicted in Figure 2. The National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) of the United States 
is an interagency agreement that provides coordinated SAR services for domestic and 
international needs.  
Established in 1974, the interagency committee of SAR was founded and named 
National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC). NSARC includes eight federal agencies 
to include the Department of Defense (DoD). SAR is defined as providing monitoring, 
initial medical assistance, and/or evacuation of personnel in distress utilizing government 
and civilian resources that could include any support aircraft, or vessels (National Search 
and Rescue Committee, 2018).  
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is overall in charge of domestic SAR 
efforts and “provides, coordinates, and uses resources for the efficient organization and 
conduct of SAR services including SAR operations within DoD’s SSR.” (National Search 
and Rescue Committee, 2019, p. 310). They are not to be dependent upon civil, 
commercial, or Coast Guard resources to cover their military operations.  
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Figure 2. U.S. Navy MH-60S conducting SAR in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountain Range, CA. Source: U.S. Navy (2018). 
The six SAR units in the United States and in our study are generally co-located with 
other military aircraft. Each SAR unit is composed of two to four MH60’s operated by 
active duty military pilots and aircrew. Maintenance differs slightly at each location and 
can be conduct by the following; all active duty personnel, a mix of active duty and civilian 
personnel, or completely contracted personnel. NAS Lemoore SAR unit was comprised of 
active duty pilots and aircrew with a fully contracted out service for maintenance of their 
four aircraft. Primarily serving as a response unit for F-18 training in W-283 operational 
area (OPAREA), the SAR unit has the ability for maritime SAR efforts as well as land-
based SAR. With other SAR units within proximity, Lemoore has a unique coverage area 
of sea, dessert, mountains. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF NAVY STATION SEARCH AND 
RESCUE (SAR) LOCATED IN KEY WEST, FL, AND WHIDBEY 
ISLAND, WA 
In 2019, Christensen and Sciberras examined the Navy’s Search and Rescue 
operations at NAS Key West and Whidbey Island per a request by OPNAV N98. The 
request was to analyze the first two of six NASs to consider alternative ways to conduct 
the SAR operations at these locations to help mitigate the potential shortage of MH-60S 
helicopters, shown in Figure 3, in the fleet in the near future. Tables 4 and 5 show the 
results of their research and analysis. We used this as a baseline for our research and 
analysis conducted at NAS Lemoore. Due to unforeseen circumstances, a series of strong 
earthquakes struck near NAS China Lake, limiting our ability to obtain an adequate amount 
of data to conduct an ample analysis. 
Christensen and Sciberras’s analysis of SAR at NAS Key West and Whidbey Island 
included three different COAs, with their cost results located in Tables 1 and 2. Their first 
COA consisted of replacing the full military maintenance team with a CFT maintenance 
team, almost identical to the status quo of NAS Lemoore SAR. The resulting decision to 
replace the active duty personnel would generate a reduction in the number of active duty 
personnel by 15 at NAS Whidbey Island. This ultimately reduced their personnel costs and 
the active duty fully burdened costs. The same COA was examined for SAR at NAS Key 
West, reducing the number of total active duty by 24. Similar types of cost savings were 
recognized in Key West, however, at a larger scale because of the larger amount of active 





Figure 3. MH-60S Search and Rescue Helicopter Stationed at NAS Whidbey 
Island. 
The second COA, the CFT maintenance team remained in place, however instead 
of the pilots and maintenance team utilizing the MH-60 helicopter, they opted to evaluate 
the option of procuring the Sikorsky S-92 helicopter to replace the MH-60S. The S-92 has 
many additional benefits over the MH-60, as discussed in Chapter V. Although the upfront 
cost of the S-92 were greater than the current cost of a MH-60, they also found that, if the 
Navy could extend the life of the S-92 with further SLEP’d, the Navy could see cost savings 
over the long term relative to the status quo. The extended lifespan of the S-92 and a CFT 
maintenance team generated potential cost savings for both NAS Whidbey Island and Key 
West. 
For their last COA, Christensen and Sciberras analyzed the option of utilizing a 
fully contracted aircrew and CFT maintenance crew to replace all active duty personnel. 
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This eliminated all active duty personnel costs as well as the active duty fully burdened 
costs. The fully contracted aircrew would consist of 12 trained aircrew to carry out the 
SAR mission. The resulting cost savings ended up being the greatest among all COA’s they 
considered; however, the unintended consequences of making this drastic change needs to 
be considered. Additionally, the aircraft costs were calculated utilizing the data available 
for a popular civilian SAR aircraft, the Bell 214 B. 
We follow the methodology from the CBA for SAR at NAS Whidbey Island and 
Key West presented by Christensen and Sciberras (2019). The Whidbey Island and Key 
West NAS SAR units utilized a full active duty complement of maintainers as the status 
quo, while NAS Lemoore already utilizes a CFT maintenance crew. Therefore, the cost 
savings Christensen and Sciberras found in replacing the active personnel would not be 
recognized unless utilizing a fully contracted SAR team. Additionally, NAS Lemoore has 
been previously shut down in 2004, reinstating the SAR unit at the base in year as a result 
of the study by Biros, Corpus, Hines, & Riggs (2009). We reviewed Biros et al., and, based 
on the current and projected amount of flight hours and conditions, we found that the fully 
contracted SAR would not be a viable option unless the scope of operations were to change 
significantly.
12 




Table 2. COA Breakdown for NAS Key West. Source: Christensen & Sciberras (2019). 
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B. COST ANALYSIS FOR A DEDICATED SEARCH AND RESCUE 
CAPABILITY FOR COMMANDER STRIKE FIGHTER WING U.S. 
PACIFIC FLEET 
Biros et al. (2009) completed their project about reestablishing a dedicated SAR 
unit at NAS Lemoore (NASL) in support of the strike fighter aircraft located on NASL. 
The original SAR unit was disbanded due to reduction in funds and there was not a great 
need for a dedicated SAR unit. As the number of squadrons and aircraft grew, however, it 
was clear that a dedicated, on-site, SAR unit would be necessary in order to facilitate the 
growing number of flights in the over-land MOAs and over-water Warning areas. The 
increase in flights, paired with the upsurge in aircraft, amplified the probability of an in-
flight mishap occurring.  
The project group examined the lowest-cost option for dedicated SAR to support 
NASL operations. The group included the SAR units at NAS Whidbey Island, Fallon, and 
China Lake for comparisons to get better estimates on costs, personnel requirements, and 
aircraft requirements would be. Using this information, the group then compared the cost 
for creating a new SAR unit against the cost of having a detachment based in NASL. 
Instead of creating a new, stand-alone unit, one of the three surrounding area SAR units 
would provide aircrew, maintenance personnel, and aircraft to have a semi-permanent SAR 
unit on NASL.  
The last option that the group examined was to find the costs associated with a 
dedicated contract SAR from a commercial company to be based at NASL. This means 
that the aircrew, maintenance personnel, and aircraft would all be contract owned and 
operated, with the government paying for services to support the flight operations of 
NASL.  
It was determined that 240 flight hours a year would be enough to support all NASL 
operations. The group took the generalized costs from the other bases and from the contract 
option and broke the costs down to find the cost per each flight hour. They multiplied this 
by the 240 flight hours per year to find the estimated yearly cost of each option.  
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From the results, the group made an easy recommendation that the detachment 
concept would be the lowest cost option. In cost per flight hour, these are the results: NAS 
Whidbey Island - $16,875, NAS Fallon – $17,354, NAWS China Lake - $16,489, 
Detachment Concept - $7,732, and Contract –$9,415. 
The detachment concept was much cheaper than the other options, but just like the 
three other military options, there were too many downsides to this option to make it viable. 
The main drawback was the procurement of personnel and aircraft needed for a military 
unit. The personnel and aircraft would have to be taken away from the established SAR 
units, which they could not afford to give up for an extended period.  
Some of the side effects with a restricted budget and the military options would be 
with the military personnel, their families and the aircraft. With the displacement of the 
military personnel, would the families move to another base until the budget was high 
enough to support the SAR again, or would they be moved temporarily on a detachment 
away from their home base in NASL? The second problem would be with the aircraft: 
Where would it go during a reduced budget? Would these helicopters be shut down and 
left in their hangar awaiting the flight hours to operate, or would the aircraft be sent to 
another base that could use them while they awaited the changes to the budget? With either 
option, it would be very difficult and administratively painful switching the ownership of 
the personnel and aircraft.  
That left the most attractive and most cost-effective option as the contract SAR 
option. It had the second lowest costs and came with the most flexibility as well. The 
government could choose to pay for yearly contract options, so if the budget was reduced, 
there would not be long-term side effects that would come with a military option. The other 
benefit that a contracted SAR unit would be the time to establish the unit.  
The team estimated that for the military operation to become up and running, it 
would take anywhere from 12–24 months while the personnel and aircraft were transferred 
to the new duty station at NASL. The detachment option would have a quick turnaround 
time to establish the SAR unit, but there was quality of life concerns with the military 
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personnel with the amount of time they would have to spend on detachment away from 
their home base and families.  
The contract option would mean that although some of the quality of life issues 
may be present, the personnel would know this before they took that position, and the 
burden would not directly fall on the U.S. Navy. The contract unit was also seen as an 
immediate response to a need for the SAR support while the Navy found an organic 
military option to be filled within a few years of the implementation.  
As of 2019, NASL SAR has military aircrew and contract maintenance, just like all 
of the other Navy SAR units in the country. This keeps the mission set within the Navy, 
but keeps the costs lower per flight hour utilizing the contract maintenance.  
This project report is relevant to our thesis because of the history on NASL. The 
reason that the SAR unit was brought back, the increase in support requirements, is still a 
growing concern at NASL, even more now with the addition of the F-35 to NASL, which 
means more operational support requirements. The increased requirement for night support 
over-water, however, has restricted the full-contract option in our scenario due to 
contractor limitations in this role.  
C. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MARINE CORPS SEARCH AND 
RESCUE (SAR): A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVES FOR MARINE CORPS 
AIR STATIONS AT CHERRY POINT AND YUMA 
Similar to our group’s thesis, Collins and Williamson (2013) chose to analyze 
domestic Marine Corp SAR units to find more efficient ways to conduct operations. This 
research focused on finding a cost effective alternative and conduct comparison with each 
recommendation. Seeing a trend in the recent past of three Marine SAR units being closed 
with either the Navy or Coast Guard assuming duties, the authors saw it necessary to 
examine the two remaining SAR units left. Primarily, they asked if a similar capable 
commercial and private contract could substitute status quo at a lower cost. They also stated 
that their CBA would specifically consider fiscal dollar costs and would not compare 
qualitative cost or benefits between alternatives as our group has (Collins & Williamson, 
2013). 
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The three SAR units had been subsequently shutting down since 1998 to 2005 due 
to redundant resources from other branches of service or host nations while maintaining 
commitments to local communities and MCAS operations. The two remaining Marine 
Corp Air Stations (MCAS) Cherry Point, NC, and MCAS Yuma, AZ. Both stations are 
unique and share strong similarities to our proposed SAR stations. Cherry Point SAR was 
given amnesty, as a fast response time was critical when responding to rescues in the frigid 
Atlantic waters. The nearest SAR unit from another entity was the Coast Guard unit in 
Elizabeth City, NC, almost 100 miles north of their MCAS, increasing transit time, 
resource needs and lower familiarity with local area of operations.  
This scenario is almost mirror image of what we faced with NAS Lemoore; CA. 
Majority of SAR operations were conducted over water in OPAREA W-283. The SAR unit 
was the only unit capable of responding quickly against any downed aircraft or vessels. 
The nearest SAR unit is the Coast Guard unit in San Francisco who would have to fly south 
to Salinas, CA, airport to refuel and then conduct its SAR mission. Water temperature in 
the local area is below 55 degrees Fahrenheit on average, putting great risk of loss of life 
if a SAR effort is protracted.  
MCAS Yuma has a strong Marine aviation and ground presence to include Marine 
Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Marine Aircraft Group-13, Marine Wing 
Support Squadron 371 and Marine Air Control Squadron One. The nearest SAR station, 
San Diego, has an average one-hour flight time to reach Yuma. Once the San Diego SAR 
has reached YUMA, it is more than likely they would have to land and refuel before taking 
off again to conduct a SAR mission. NAS Lemoore, CA, has a strong presence of aviation 
as well, to include the new F-35 squadrons being added to the NAS soon. The nearest SAR 
stations are China Lake, CA, and Fallon, NV, each with their own  
Their final recommendation from Collins and Williamson was for the MCAS to 
replace current SAR units with the commercial AWS18 helicopter and hold commercial 
contracts. It was estimated that this action could potentially save the Marine Corp $14 
million dollars per year (FY2014). Again, they only focused on fiscal dollars and did not 
consider cost and benefit comparisons indirectly. Our group aims to find a cost-effective 
18 
method as well but will consider indirect costs and benefits in order to obtain a more 
thorough analysis and recommendation. 
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IV. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR SAR AT NAVAL AIR 
STATION LEMOORE, CA 
A. METHODOLOGY 
A CBA is an ideal tool for the DoD and USN in this case because we assigned a 
monetary value to each piece of the problem in order to decide which COA best achieved 
the overall objective. The Circular A-94 is the document that provides general guidelines 
for a CBA to be conducted on government programs. This document ensures that our 
process follows a standard routine to ensure that the federal government makes a well-
informed decision on projects that have costs and benefits stretched over a period of time, 
as in our case. These constraints provide the steps that we follow to make sure that our 
analysis is thorough and complete (Department of Defense, 1992). 
These are the nine steps to a CBA that we used for analysis: 
1. Specify the set of alternative projects. 
2. Decide whose benefits and costs count (standing). 
3. Identify the impact categories, catalogue them, and select measurement 
indicators.  
4. Predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of the project. 
5. Monetize (attach dollar values to) all inputs. 
6. Discount benefits and costs to obtain present values.  
7. Compute the net present value of each alternative.  
8. Perform sensitivity analysis. 
9. Make a recommendation. (Boardman, 2006, vol. 4) 
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B. CBA BREAKDOWN FOR NAVY SAR 
1. Step 1: Set of Alternatives 
Status Quo – U.S. Navy SAR missions are currently operated with the MH-60S 
helicopter. This aircraft is flown by active duty navy pilots along with enlisted aircrew 
members. Maintenance and support personnel at NASL are filled by contract maintenance 
personnel. 
Evaluation – We examined three COAs against the status quo: 
a. COA 1 – Re-locate active duty SAR aircrew and contract field team at 
Salinas Airport as satellite squadron under command of the Helicopter Sea Combat Wing, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, CA.  
b. COA 2 – Maintain Active duty SAR aircrew, CFT maintenance, estimated 
cost to replace MH-60S with S-92. 
c. COA 3 – Active duty SAR aircrew, CFT maintenance, estimated cost to 
replace MH-60S with Bell-214ST 
Project Life – Our perspective for analysis was a five-year timeline. This is based 
on the initial project requirements and limitations relating to the life of the current 
inventory of MH-60S that are in the fleet today. Our research focused on the 
implementation of potential changes to SAR units within the next five years while we 
looked at the follow-on effects of those changes, against our assumptions, over this time 
period.  
Timing and Format – Since the policy has not yet been implemented, and the 
projected increase in the overwater flights, we will take an Ex ante look into the topic. The 
military does anticipate implementing a policy to change SAR operations. We will look to 
see if the benefits outweigh the costs of policy implementation by using an “Ex Ante” 
perspective, which means that the CBA is conducted prior to the implementation of any 
decisions. This format is beneficial because it shows whether an organization should put 
time and/or effort into making changes to a project or program. (Boardman, 2006) 
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2. Step 2: Who Has Standing 
The parties that have standing in this CBA are the DoD, USN, and NAS Lemoore, 
Lemoore SAR unit. We will be taking a National perspective in our analysis. The scope of 
the CBA could be local, state, regional, national or global. We chose to go with the national 
scope because the DoD and USN are national organizations and our costs and benefits 
spread across the country.  
3. Step 3: Identify Impact Categories 
Direct Benefits 
1. If we choose to relocate the SAR squadron to Salinas airport, the flight 
hours required for transit to support W-283 operations will be reduced 
dramatically. 
2. Utilizing a different aircraft for SAR operations will help to reduce the 
strain on the current MH-60S fleet. 
3. Relocation to Salinas and removing the rappel mission set would reduce 
the required flight hours per year, which would extend the life of an 
aircraft.  
4. If we remove any mission set that requires any form of rappelling for this 
SAR unit, that will reduce the required flight hours by approximately 50% 
(R. Bieze. NAS Lemoore SAR Unit Executive Officer interview with the 
author, August 6, 2019) 
Indirect Benefits 
1. If they are based in Salinas, it will increase productivity of the crew, 
which is in Salinas standing up the alert aircraft.  
2. Assigning the SAR squadron as a satellite squadron of the HSC Wing, it 
would increase availability of parts and personnel.  
22 
3. Diversify skillset for pilots across numerous aircraft 
Direct Costs (Policy Change) 
1. Direct costs associated with relocating personnel, as depicted in Tables 11 
and 12. 
2. Direct costs with the procurement of a new aircraft, as depicted in 
Table 10. 
3. Direct costs associated with training aircrew to operate a new platform.  
Indirect Costs (Policy Change) 
1. Pilot skills will diminish in an MH-60S if attached to a SAR squadron for 
an extended length of time. 
2. Loss of community relations for the SAR unit no longer providing medical 
transport for community members and military members in the Lemoore 
area.  
Direct Costs (No Policy Change) 
1. With an impending helicopter shortage, the Navy would be forced to 
purchase more SAR capable aircraft, seen in Table 10, to keep SAR 
stations and fleet squadrons fully manned with MH-60S helicopters.  
2. With a mandated increase in aircraft there would, in turn, be an increase in 
manpower, training, maintenance, and overhead costs associated with 
additional helicopters.  
Indirect Costs (No Policy Change) 
1. If Lemoore SAR station were to continue to operate under CNIC, parts, 
materials, and personnel requirements will continue to be inflexible when 
compared to other SAR stations. 
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2. The strain on the current fleet of helicopters at NASL will increase due to 
the support requirements increasing as more F-35 squadrons shift 
homeport to NASL.  
4. Step 4: Predict Impacts 
With the current status quo beginning to change and the number of strike/fighter 
training requirements increasing, the strain on the current fleet of helicopters at NASL SAR 
will increase. The squadron currently has four helicopters and must maintain the previously 
described alert status during flight operations. If the number of hours of training flights in 
W-283 increase, then that means that these aircraft must fly more frequently to support the 
training flights. Maintenance inspections are usually based on a flight hour schedule, which 
means that almost every 200 hours or so, the helicopter is in a “down” status until the 
inspection is complete. With flying more frequently, that means that there are less calendar 
days between maintenance inspections and the aircraft spends more time in the inspection 
window. We will discuss later in this thesis how this problem can be solved.  
One of the biggest impacts that the Navy would see if they switched SAR aircraft 
is the training of pilots and aircrew to the new platform. We are assuming all pilots and 
aircrew have previous helicopter experience; they would all need to go through at least 
twelve weeks of flight training on the new platform. We are assuming that the maintainers 
would continue to be CFT personnel with the new platform as well. This means that the 
fleet Navy would initially be without upwards of twelve pilots and twenty aircrew, for each 
squadron, for twelve weeks (Bieze, 2019). 
After the squadron’s new aircraft were in place, the only aircrew would only need 
to rotate before they joined the command. These personnel would also need to be retrained 
on the MH-60S before they returned to the fleet, but this training would be around six 
weeks. The Navy would then need to factor in these training windows for PCS moves that 
could affect when and how often the personnel get to move. This increased time transiting 
between commands, while training, would increase the cost for personnel viewed in Tables 
11 and 12, and their families.  
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The next impact is the location of the training aircraft. The best solution for the 
Navy would be to have one of the helicopter training commands around the country be the 
hub for all new SAR training. Ideally, the Navy would choose a new SAR option that would 
not only be a catchall solution for all SAR units around the country but could serve as a 
training unit for younger pilots as they move through the pipeline for the MH-60S aircraft. 
For example, the Bell aircraft would be a training platform for a student helicopter pilot in 
either primary, intermediate, or advanced training, as well as any fleet pilot going to a SAR 
unit.  
This option would help reduce any future costs of training, once the training fleet 
was filled with the new aircraft as well. If this new aircraft could not serve dual training 
purposes it will still benefit the Navy to have it co-located with a training command, which 
would have all the support already in place to train the fleet pilots and aircrew, they would 
just need to add another helicopter in their stable to train with and maintain.  
5. Step 5: Monetize Impacts 
In order to try to compare each COA against each other for the CBA, we needed to 
ensure that all the costs are monetized equally. We gathered a lot of cost data for the CBA 
that included the costs for the different helicopter variants, the contract maintenance 
personnel (Table 13), replacement part, fuel, relocation expenses, etc. We took this data 
from across five years and divided it by the total number of flight hours over the same 
period to give us a cost per flight hour that we would use to compare our COAs against 
each other.  
The next step that closely ties to SAR operations is the value of a life saved or lost. 
We used information provided by Boardman (Boardman, 2006) along with a related Naval 
Postgraduate School Project (Rohlfs, Sullivan, & Kniesner, 2015), and then adjusted for 
inflation to calculate that the value of a statistical life in October of 2018 is worth $10 
million.  
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6. Step 6: Discount Rate 
With the discount rate, this is one area that we needed to keep in line with the other 
groups’ finding to help ensure that all the COAs were relatively comparable. If we used a 
different rate than another group, it could skew one group having higher costs, or another 
group having lesser benefits. In either case, we wanted an even playing field. For this 
reason, we chose to use the seven percent discount rate. This rate is also in accordance with 
the industry standard when it comes to the U.S. Government and federal proposals that 
provide potential benefits to military members (Department of Defense, 1992). The 
impacts are classified as “internal benefits,” and it is also appropriately calculated at the 
seven percent real interest rate (Boardman, 2006). 
7. Step 7: Compute NPV 
This data is presented in the Results (Chapter V) portion of this thesis. 
8. Step 8: Sensitivity Analysis 
Each COA and the status quo are defined using simplifying assumptions and use 
data estimates that are not perfect. To validate the findings from the CBA, the sensitivity 
analysis relaxes some of the important assumptions and examines the net cost savings in 
relation to these assumptions. 
We used the sensitivity analysis to help us find the expected value as a measure 
reflecting risks, to help us investigate the robustness of net benefits relative to uncertainty, 
and to help us value the information as a benefit for the CBA (Boardman, 2006). For 
example, by switching the ISIC, we assume that the flow of parts and personnel would 
become more efficient and benefit the unit and the HSC wing. With this scenario, we 
needed to find out how this would benefit the parties, if there were any tangible benefits or 
costs associated with it, and lastly, what the probability of the scenario playing out as 
expected.  
By using the sensitivity analysis, we could examine the practicality of our 
assumptions in each COA. It also encouraged us to deviate and think outside the box when 
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it came to any other variables and even COAs for this thesis. An in-depth sensitivity 
analysis will be covered in Chapter V. 
9. Step 9: Our Recommendation 
This will be provided as part of our conclusion and final analysis Chapter VI. 
C. CBA FOR LEMOORE AND CHINA LAKE 
Along with maintaining the current status quo, we have provided three additional 
COAs for consideration. We took the requirements from the sponsor, the time constraints, 
and parameters of the analysis to identify three possibilities that would provide the U.S. 
Navy options to better utilize the fleet of MH-60S helicopters. One of the main constraints 
was the operating area over water in Warning Area 283 (W-283), as it was imperative that 
the SAR aircraft and its crew could operate over water. This limited our COA options away 
from a contract SAR possibility, and significantly limited the viable aircraft possibilities.  
Naval Air Station Lemoore (NASL) is a unique NAS as it was the only one of the 
six selected NASs to have been previously shut down after being operational. We were 
eager to contact NASL to see the difference in operations after they had been reopened for 
operations. The unit was closed IN 2004 as part of a money-saving operation but was 
reopened only a few short years later, IN 2012, due to the risk of the fighter squadrons 
flying operations without SAR support.  
We were unable, however, to conduct a full CBA of NAS China Lake (NASCL) 
SAR unit. Despite numerous attempts and requests for information, we encountered 
resistance, probably due to fear that our analysis would “shut them down” just as Lemoore 
had been shut down years before. We did receive answers to an initial questionnaire but 
our requests to perform an on-site visit or any interviews over the phone went unanswered.  
D. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COAs 
In this section, we will clarify some of the background information that served as 
the foundation for supporting our COAs, the AORs of NASL, and this study. Themes that 
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we suggest in this section highlight the differences in switching aircraft or choosing to 
relocate the unit to Salinas, CA.  
1. Potential Excess of MH-60S Aircraft 
By not maintaining the status quo, the existing SAR helicopters may become 
available for use amongst the fleet. From (Christensen & Sciberras, 2019, p.25), it was 
stated that the Navy already has an excess of MH-60Rs and that the Navy has spent billions 
of dollars to purchase the current fleet while paying millions more to store them. (The MH-
60R, or “Romeo” as it is commonly referred to, is a helicopter that is based off the same 
airframe as the “Sierra” but has a larger and more robust avionics suite that allows it to 
perform operations that are more intricate. The Romeo does not normally perform SAR 
duties because all the avionics equipment in the back of the helicopter does not leave much, 
if any, room for SAR equipment or those needing transport).  
One option would to procure an entirely new aircraft, as presented in COA 2 and 
3, or to provide more efficient and effective depot-level repair facilities of the current fleet 
of the MH-60S. In a GAO report dated April 2019, maintenance facilities were found to be 
increasing worse over the course of 2013–2017. The study examined Fleet Readiness 
Centers (FRC) Southeast and Southwest, both which restore and modernize MH-60R and 
MH-60Ss. The GAO examined the performance, facilities, and equipment at each location. 
Fleet Readiness Center Southeast has gotten worse in the metric of performance and 
equipment while an inconclusive rating was given to their facilities. Fleet Readiness Center 
Southwest additionally was graded as gotten worse over time in all three categories. Both 
FRCs had an excess of backlogged projects totaling millions of dollars. Further research in 
this area should be considered prior to making a final decision on SAR employment.  
2. Aircraft Choice for SAR 
For the purpose of this study, we decided to look at two additional aircraft that may 
be procured in order to carry out the SAR mission. There are several reasons we decided 
upon this assertion, with the biggest assertion being that a civilian contracted service would 
not meet the requirements presented by the Lemoore AOR to fly over water, at night on 
night vision goggles. Although civilian companies may provide this specific service in the 
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future, as it currently stands, there are no companies that would do this. Therefore, we went 
with the scenario as it currently sits because the timeline is unknown on the civilian option. 
a. Sikorsky S-92
As analyzed in Christensen & Sciberras, we also concluded that the S-92 costs are 
significantly higher than any other COA. The S-92 boasts and impressive payload 
capability as well as a significant range advantage over the other aircraft, however, the 
price tag for the SAR mission may be unreasonably high for utilization with the NAS SAR 
mission. As the fighter missions move west over more open-water warning areas and 
further from the shoreline, the price tag for a helicopter with longer range may become 
closer to being acceptable.  
b. Bell 214ST
Civilian contracting services would utilize the Bell 214ST, a twin-engine variant of 
the Bell 214 line of helicopters. Since civilian contractors do not provide the necessary 
requirements for overwater, at night, operations, the majority of current and future 
operations at NAS Lemoore, we have decided to consider the procurement of the Bell 
214ST. The Bell 214ST is similar to the 214B, however, is a twin-engine helicopter, similar 
to the MH-60S currently employed. The Bell 214ST still lacks the maximum take-off 
weight and range of the S-92 and MH-60S, but it does boast a greater maximum take-off 
weight, range, and a twin-engine platform for added safety for overwater operations.  
The additional engine provides not only a sense of comfort in emergency situations 
but also serves as a redundant system. If one engine fails while performing a flight 
overwater, the aircraft will still be able to make it home on the one remaining engine. This 
is not an issue for SAR units that operate only overland or near land because these aircraft 
can land on any surface. If overwater on one engine, there is only one solution, and that 
ends in getting wet and being difficult to find.  
What the Bell 214ST lacks when compared to the 214B is its service ceiling. The 
Bell 214B can reach a maximum service ceiling of 16,400 ft while the 214ST can only 
reach 10,400 ft. This is troubling in mountainous areas, where NAS Lemoore operates 
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currently. This could potentially limit the number of rescues performed and potentially 
affect the number of lives lost.  
3. CFT and Civilian Workforce
During our site visit and multiple interviews, it was apparent that CFT maintenance 
was done well, however, many individuals were flustered with the timeliness of the ability 
to complete the maintenance required. The CFT is required to perform their work in 
accordance with the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program and applicable Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program Standing Operating Procedures (NAMPSOP). Within the governing 
documents, a time required to complete the maintenance is listed. CFT maintainers will 
adhere to these standards, even if the work is completed. Hence, even if the required work 
is completed within an hour, but the governing document specifies that one and a half hour 
is required to complete the maintenance, the CFT maintainer will not begin another 
maintenance action until after the hour and a half has expired.  
This frustration will not happen with military maintainers, as they can log the actual 
amount of time it took to conduct the maintenance and continue onto the next maintenance 
item. Additionally, the officers and senior enlisted personnel do not hold any positional 
authority over the CFT maintainers. The issue of switching back to an all-military 
maintenance department is unlikely to change due to the cost savings that the contract 
maintenance brings. It is a better idea to rework the maintenance actions when the contract 
negotiations are conducted.  
In W-283, NASL main operating area frequently encounters low-level fog and 
clouds. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandates that pilots do not take off 
unless weather meets specified requirements (ASA, 2016, p. 180). Civilian entities 
associated with SAR operate using the FAA’s visual flight rules. Under these provisions, 
helicopter pilots cannot take off unless they are able to stay at least 500 feet below clouds 
and prevailing visibility is one statute mile.  
In such an AOR where weather is poor roughly six months of the calendar year, 
weather minimums often do not meet requirements and civilian pilots (or their companies) 
are unable to accept risks for special consideration due to inclement weather. Military pilots 
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accept a higher level of risk when they fly and are authorized to utilize their instruments as 
prescribed by the DoD. Civilian SAR assets would need additional training and require 
waivers from FAA regulations to perform missions in these conditions. 
4. ISIC Structure
Currently NASL’s SAR squadron falls under Commander Naval Installations 
Command (CNIC) at NASL, which means the Commanding Officer of the base is also the 
CO for the SAR unit. The base provides some administrative services and support all on-
board aircraft that includes the fighters and helicopters, etc. The base provides firefighting 
functions, air traffic control, flight scheduling, operation and maintenance of navigational 
aids, ground approach radar communications equipment, emergency arresting gear, and 
optical landing devices.  
The Lemoore SAR squadron reports to NAS Base Operations Officer as their 
Executive Officer, but he has command over day-to-day operations. With the base CO only 
being involved on rare occasions. Complications arise from operating under such a chain 
of command because CNIC is not an operational command; it is administrative only. This 
means that operational units take priority over replacement parts and personnel, 
replacement aircraft, flight hour distribution, etc., with the SAR units being on the back 
burner.  
The flow of communication becomes trickier as well. Fleet aircraft only have to 
make such requests to the HSC Wing on their respective coast where NASL SAR has to 
make any request through the base CO, then up through the CNIC chain of command, 
before heading over to the operational side to Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF), and 
then down to the HSC wing. It is a long, drawn out process that easily becomes convoluted 
and inefficient. It is common for CNIC and CNAF to have a discussion who will own the 
issue and ultimately, pay for any issue because although CNIC owns the NASL SAR unit, 
they are an operational unit as well which means that the HSC Wing has some ownership 
as well. This confusion can result in the delaying resources to the squadron thus limiting 
the operation capabilities of the unit. 
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When the SAR unit needs parts, the request can take days or weeks, and that is only 
if the HSC Wing has the parts available, and no operational squadrons need the parts. The 
same issue occurs if the squadron has a pilot of aircrew who is injured. That member would 
theoretically be medically unable to fly, and therefore the squadron would be understaffed 
until a replacement body is provided by the HSC Wing. If the SAR Unit were a satellite 
unit of the HSC wing, the replacement personnel would be able to be streamlined, just like 
the replacement parts process. The injured member could return to the helicopter flight 
school, or another facet of the wing, and be replaced by a fully functioning member, 
temporarily, or permanently.  
On most days, the SAR unit has four aircraft, one of which is in San Diego at getting 
depot-level maintenance where the aircraft is non-operational for a few months, minimum. 
Another helicopter is under a phased-maintenance program in the hangar and is down for 
a few weeks with longer inspections or larger maintenance repairs. The third aircraft is in 
the hangar at NASL getting minor maintenance repairs but is on standby for the “up” 
aircraft, if that one has an issue. The third helicopter can become operational in mere hours. 
The fourth aircraft is the one that is used for day-to-day operations and the alert aircraft. 
Maintenance is only permitted once the two “ready birds” swap positions.  
We believe that by switching over the ISIC to HSC Wing it would remove the time 
delay and confusion with communications. It would also increase the operational efficiency 
of the SAR unit and therefore could even return one or two of the four aircraft back to the 
fleet to be utilized by operational squadrons or used at the training squadron.  
5. Base of Operations
Currently, SAR Lemoore operates under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
that requires the squadron to maintain a two-hour response time in support of W-283, W-
285, and W-532 areas and to preposition a SAR helicopter and crew at an airfield near the 
coast – Salinas Municipal Airport. The SAR unit is required to maintain ten continuous 
hours each day, Monday through Friday, and seven hours on Sunday. Upon notification of 
“Last Plane Feet Dry,” the helicopter and crew are to return to NAS Lemoore and re-
establish a two-hour SAR response for overland areas (DoN, 2019). 
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The transit time between Lemoore and Salinas is 45 minutes each way and total 
approximately 275 hours each quarter. By switching the base of operations to Salinas 
airport, 275 hours in transit would be saved and used for training and exercises instead. If 
the unit did not need to transit to and from Salinas, however, they could keep the number 
of flights the same and just not utilize these flight hours. This would allow the Navy to 
save money in the form of the cost per flight hour metric that we used in this analysis. This 
cost includes fuel, parts, maintenance, etc.  
Another benefit from removing the need for the transit to Salinas is the reduced 
wear and tear on the aircraft, which is in line with the purpose of this project. Instead of an 
aircraft going into a phase maintenance inspection twice a year or so, it could be shifted to 
once a year instead. This can be translated to long-term benefits through the life of the 
aircraft with a potential to increase the life expectancy of the aircraft before it reaches its 
10,000- or 12,500-hour limit.  
When the current crew arrives at Salinas to stand up the alert aircraft for the ten-
hour shift, they get the aircraft ready to take off, and then they wait. They sit and wait for 
most of their shift without being able to do any of the normal ground jobs that Navy pilots 
and aircrew are accustomed to. While in the hangar in Lemoore if a pilot does not have a 
flight, he will perform his duties like any other day. This could include training other 
members in the squadron, completing necessary reports, to little things like responding to 
emails.  
If the unit was permanently based in Salinas, the alert aircraft could be set while 
the personnel are performing their day-to-day duties. This would essentially increase the 
productivity of the alert crew from zero to 100%, depending on the type of day. The lack 
of office space and internet connectivity is a hindrance on the efficient use of the 
personnel’s time.  
If the unit were in Salinas, it would also afford the crewmembers’ some flexibility 
with their day as well. As it is currently, if there is an issue with a crewmember that is on 
the alert crew in Salinas (an illness or with other personal issues, for example), and this 
crewmember needs to return to NASL, the entire helicopter needs to load up, fly 45 minutes 
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to NASL, swap out the crewmember, and then return to Salinas. The flight time and time 
on deck could gap the SAR support coverage up to two and a half hours, which could lead 
to adjusted or even cancelled fighter aircraft flight operations. If the unit is based in Salinas, 
and there was an issue with a crewmember, it would keep the alert up and ready without 
any gap in coverage.  
6. Public Relations and Medical Emergencies
The city of Lemoore and the surrounding areas a greatly appreciate the ability of 
high-altitude rescues, night operations, the ability to hoist rescue victims, and mountain 
rescue by the SAR unit. SAR assets already in the region (NAS Fallon, NAS China Lake, 
and Mono County), however, already have coverage over most of the mountainous areas 
that NASL SAR currently covers. Over the last several years, NAS Lemoore was able to 
respond to one patient in Lemoore as well as two mountain rescues. With the unit moving 
to Salinas, a negative side effect of this would be the increased response time to victims 
needing rescued.  
E. ASSUMPTIONS FOR COAs 
1. Active Duty Personnel
All active duty personnel numbers were obtained through the site’s manning 
reports. Although NAS Lemoore’s SAR squadron was not fully manned, we decided to 
conduct our calculations in accordance with their manning documents as if they were fully 
manned. During our site visit, the Aviation Maintenance Technician retired recently, and 
the billet was gapped with an individual covering the job in addition to his billeted job. 
Some other assumptions were made with respect to the active duty base pay, time in service 
(TIS), for example.  
The longer a member is in the military at a certain rank, the more he or she gets 
paid. This factor is difficult to adjust for when determining the monthly salary of an active-
duty member. In order to cover the large delta in possibilities of current and potential 
members, we established a mean TIS that we used for our calculations. Utilizing the FY18 
and FY19 pay scales, all base pay amounts were derived by taking average pay at each 
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rank, observing the minimum and maximum allowable TIS for each rank. In order to 
forecast the base pay for personnel over the five-year timeline, we decided to take the 
average pay increase over the span of 2012–2019 and apply this to every subsequent years, 
utilizing 2019 as the base year for all base pay amounts, because this was the latest 
information available to us. 
To compensate for the different BAH in Salinas for COA 1, we utilized the BAH 
rates for Monterey county in 2018 and 2019. In the subsequent years, we conducted a 
similar procedure as base pay taking the average nation-wide BAH increase over the span 
of 2012–2019 and applied this average to all subsequent years. 
2. Aircraft
In this analysis, all cost associated with estimating the cost of each aircraft were 
calculated utilizing the total flight hours flown in 2018. At NASL, the total hours allotted 
was 1118 hours. When observing NAS Lemoore’s allotted flight hours versus the amount 
of flight hours actually flown, the squadron always maxed out on number of hours, which 
is the reason we decided to utilize the latest full years of flying allotted as a standard. 
In order to capture the actual yearly costs of operating the aircraft we utilized the 
typical lifespan of the MH-60S. We found this to be 12,500 hours SLEP’d and 10,000 hours 
not SLEP’d (Christensen & Sciberras, 2019). In basic terms, “SLEP’d” refers to the process 
of authorization granted to an airframe to extend its useful life. In the case of the MH-60S, 
the Navy authorized the lifespan of this aircraft to be increased by 2,500 hours. We, however, 
identified that most naval aircraft are SLEP’d. Knowing this, we used the lifespan hours of 
12,500. We then took the fully burdened price of the MH-60S, shown in Table 9, and divided 
it by the number of SLEP’d hours, 12,500 and multiplied that amount by the number of hours 
flown by NAS Lemoore per year. This provided us with the yearly cost of the aircraft. We 
mirrored this method for the S-92 and Bell 214ST in COA 2 and COA 3. 
3. Maintenance
We collected the maintenance costs for the status quo, from the CFT maintenance 
on-site leadership, during our site visit to NASL, seen in Table 13. From this data, the 
35 
aviation depot level repairable (AVDLR) part costs and aviation maintenance fleet (AFM) 
costs were averaged from the quarterly reports provided. The AVDLR costs includes items 
such as aircraft parts that can be repaired or replaced and the AFM costs refer to the 
category of the aircraft’s consumable items. We then computed an average quarterly 
maintenance cost for these parts. There are no active duty maintenance personnel at NASL, 
and therefore, they were not included in these costs.  
We were unable to gather enough data to calculate the actual maintenance costs 
associated with the S-92 and the Bell 214ST. For our analysis to continue, we assumed that 
the CFT maintenance contract costs would remain comparable to the current cost for 
maintenance on the MH-60S. Contract costs for CFT maintenance were obtained from 
contracting data from our site visit to Lemoore.  
In order to inflate each cost associated with maintenance for each subsequent year 
we utilized inflation indices created on the Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) from the Naval 
Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA). Of the indices listed, we utilized the Operations and 
Maintenance index with 2018 as the base year.  
4. Facilities
Our team was unable to acquire facility costs for the SAR unit’s hangar space. Due 
to this speedbump, and along with keeping consistent with the two other projects, we also 
use facility cost data provided by the team who analyzed NAS Whidbey Island, which 
included utilities, facility maintenance and building services for an entire year. We 
assumed that these costs would be comparable to NASL; therefore, we used this as our 
facility costs. This assumption was also utilized for the hangar in Salinas, as we could not 
obtain any credible data for the total cost of the hangar and the associated space needed for 
offices and maintenance. We believe more time is needed to acquire specific cost data for 
these two bases in order to make a more accurate decision in this case.  
5. Active Duty Fully Burdened
For consistency with Christensen and Sciberras (2019) , we utilized data from the 
RAND study (Dahlman, 2007) to summarize the full costs and benefits of an active duty 
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member. Dahlman (2007) uses data from the healthcare, military housing, commissary, 
separation pay, and retirement pay, etc., utilized by military members, to calculate 
applicable benefits and costs. These figures can be found in Tables 6, 7 and 8 in the 
Appendix A.  
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V. RESULTS 
A. THE DATA 
Our team was able to compile data from a variety of sources. By far, the greatest 
resource was the site visit and to interviews the CFT maintenance crews, pilots, and aircrew 
on the daily operations of the squadron. As previously stated, NAS China Lake and our 
team were unable to schedule a site visit that would provide useful; however, China Lake 
did provide a limited amount of data that we discuss in our results. Our team analyzed the 
data that we gathered using the assumptions and CBA steps described in Chapter IV to 
develop our cost-benefit analysis model. The CBA analysis includes only the monetized 
costs for each course of action over the span of five years and does not consider the non-
monetized trade-offs covered in the previous chapter. It is important to note that, although 
cost comparisons can be insightful, careful consideration must be given to non-monetary 
trade-offs. 
1. SAR at NAS Lemoore
NAS Lemoore was ultimately our only site visit but was unique in that it is the only 
station to have been previously shut down. We attempted to connect with individuals who 
were present during the shutdown, but almost all personnel from that era either relocated 
or had retired by the time of our visit. NASL is located in Central California, approximately 
30 miles south of Fresno, and conducts operations in the Sierra Nevada mountains and over 
water, just off the coast of Central California. All of these factors were taken into account 
when developing each COA. A full breakdown of the costs included in each COA can be 
found in Table 3. 
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Table 3. COA Breakdown for NAS Lemoore 
Notes: The above table is a comparison of each analyzed COAs for NAS Lemoore for the base year of 2018. 
*Preliminary Difference refers to the difference between the COA and the status quo.
39 
a. Status Quo
Currently, NAS Lemoore comprises 35 active duty personnel and 55 maintenance 
contractors. The unit uses four MH-60Ss, as shown in Figure 4, for their SAR missions 
utilizing Salinas Airport to provide a two-hour response time in support of the overwater 
warning areas. Currently, the annual cost of running the SAR unit is approximately 
$11.2M. 
Figure 4. Lemoore Hangar 
b. COA 1
We consider moving the SAR unit to operate out of the Salinas airport permanently. 
This COA assumes that the unit will still conduct training and coverage over the Sierra 
Nevada mountain operating areas and does not reflect any change in the annual amount of 
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flight hours currently required by the unit. If moving to the Salinas airport on a permanent 
basis does change the mission set to only cover over water operations, the flight hours 
could potentially decrease by 50% (Bieze, 2019), which we will go into further detail in 
the sensitivity analysis. If the current flight hours are used in the first year, however, then 
the cost of operating the unit would increase by approximately $850,000. 
c. COA 2
We followed the previous analysis of NAS Whidbey Island and Key West and 
analyzed the feasibility of replacing the MH-60S helicopter with the S-92 (Christensen & 
Sciberras, 2019). Our team decided to keep the base of operations consistent with the status 
quo, and only analyzed the cost per hour of operating the S-92 helicopter vice the MH-60S. 
In addition to the S-92, we also found that the lifespan of the S-92 could be 
increased, or further SLEP’d, which would ultimately lower the cost over the lifespan of 
the aircraft when compared to the current MH-60S. However, due to NAS Lemoore already 
utilizing a CFT maintenance team, any other cost savings would have to be realized in 
other areas, such as decreased flight hours.  
d. COA 3
We analyzed the Bell 214ST as another replacement for the MH-60S. Like COA 2, 
our group wanted to remain in Lemoore, CA and status quo with current active duty and 
number of contractors. This allows us to analyze only the costs associated with the Bell-
214ST instead of the MH-60S. Unfortunately, the production of the Bell-214ST has 
stopped and the DoD would rely on procuring used aircraft, all with a different lifespan 
associated. The cost associated is significantly lower than COA 2, but still increased from 
status quo at a difference of $622,465.35. The procurement of the Bell-214ST would still 
increase the availability of MH-60S to the fleet, the inventory burdened aircraft the fleet 
currently faces. 
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A sensitivity analysis is a critical portion in our determination of the best COA. 
While money talks, so does each COA’s effect on the fleet, sailors, and community. 
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Specifically, a sensitivity analysis will take both uncertainties and risks within the CBA 
and be great enough to recalculate the benefits. These risks and uncertainties can have 
second and third order effects, making the legitimacy of relying solely on monetary 
calculations defunct. Of the many possibilities our group considered, we highlighted the 
most probable issues and expanded the effect they could have with each COA presented. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter IV, the following non-monetary effects were 
thoroughly examined and discussed in detail to determine the most probable outcome for 
each alternative away from status quo.  
Our first evaluation was the local community ramifications of moving the SAR unit 
from Lemoore, CA to Salinas, CA. By moving the SAR unit from its current location, the 
USN and DoD would possibly fall under a negative spotlight from the local community 
with the reduced emergency response capabilities. The current SAR unit conducts missions 
in conjunction with local community SAR and Sherriff’s office. However, NAS Lemoore’s 
AOR can be covered by NAS Fallon and NAWS China Lake if needed. The local shoreline 
is heavy in fishing and personal watercraft traffic and having a local SAR unit would be 
highly welcomed as the nearest Coast Guard station available is in San Francisco, a 45-
minute flight. 
Our team considered the second and third order effects of saving the DoD money 
by relocating the SAR unit. Long-term benefits could show that the Navy could save money 
by removing the 45-minute, one-way transit times to stand up the alert. Not only are there 
savings in fuel costs, but the aircraft’s maintenance demand is then lowered, increasing 
longevity of the aircraft. Although NAS Lemoore is not directly covered by a SAR unit, it 
does have multiple surrounding SAR units to support SAR operations if necessary. The 
status quo option shows a large overlap in coverage between NAS Lemoore, NAS Fallon, 
and NAWS China Lake, and with the relocation of the SAR unit, it can increase the overall 
coverage they provide to both military and civilian rescues. 
Finally, our group recognizes the procurement of new SAR aircraft is expensive, as 
depicted in Table 10, resource intensive, and will take time to implement. With this option, 
pressures on fleet tactical aircraft are relieved and SAR units are still able to perform their 
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necessary duties. Although it is an expensive up-front cost, it is relatively cheaper than 
relying on the fleet to procure new aircraft in the long run.  
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we examined whether the Navy should consider alternative ways to 
conduct SAR mission at NAS Lemoore, CA. Station SAR services are critical enablers to 
the generation of naval aviation force readiness; however, use of a multi-mission combat 
helicopter, the MH-60S, may not be the most economical method to deliver those services, 
particularly when balanced with an increasing fleet demand. With keeping the primary and 
secondary research questions at the forefront of our thesis, our team feels confident with 
the thoroughness in our work and with our recommendations. Each question had its own 
unique challenges, but our research accurately presents feasible considerations given our 
assumptions, methodology, and sensitivity analysis. 
What are the feasible alternatives to deliver the SAR capability at NAS 
Lemoore, CA, and NAWS China Lake, CA given the pressures on fleet tactical 
aircraft? 
We identified three feasible alternatives satisfy this requirement. COA 1 
recommends relocating active duty SAR aircrew, with contract maintenance, to Salinas, 
CA, airport as a satellite squadron under an HSC Wing, and with the amended mission set 
to remove any missions requiring aircrew to rappel. This was our most feasible option, as 
the MH-60S aircraft would remain with the squadron and longevity of aircraft is increased. 
The unit would potentially return one or two of their aircraft back to the fleet as well.  
There would also be a 100% increase in work productivity on site at the Salinas, 
CA, airport versus status quo. Falling under the HSC ISIC provides a more efficient way 
to get parts and people needed by the SAR squadron with the possibility of even returning 
one of the four aircraft back to the fleet if the parts pipeline is streamlined.  
By replacing the aircraft, Table 10 depicts a considerable cost increase monetarily; 
however, COAs 2 and 3 return MH-60S helicopters back to the fleet. Of the two civilian 
aircraft our group chose to examine, they are both comparable to the MH-60S with regard 
to the mission capability, but the Sikorsky S-92 was the most capable, and the most 
44 
expensive. The Bell 214ST was a little less capable with regard to payload capacity with 
less associated costs.  
Could outsourcing SAR services yield cost savings? If so, what are the 
intended and unintended effects on manpower and aircraft distribution, in short and 
longer run? 
NAS Lemoore presented a unique challenge as they conduct their operations over 
the Pacific Ocean in operating area W-283. With the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
squadron making its debut at Lemoore this year, the support for night flight operations will 
drastically increase in the coming months and years. Not only are SAR contracts expensive 
for over water operations but no civilian SAR companies currently perform over-water 
flights at night due to the high risk and capability limitations. 
What is a more cost-effective alternative for delivering Station SAR capability 
at each Naval Air Station (NPS & N98, 2019)?  
We found that both COAs involving civilian aircraft, although relieving pressure 
on the fleet, is monetarily demanding. For the S-92 in COA 2, we found that the cost 
differential would be $1,637,654.15, relative to the status quo. This is the highest cost of 
all COAs but has the longest fuel leg and payload capacity. The Bell-214ST was 
substantially cheaper in COA 3 had a cost differential of $622,465,35 compared to the 
status quo costs while sacrificing the capabilities.  
COA 1 had a lower cost differential of $857,446 (addendum year 1 cost is 
$523,614.42, with a year 2 cost of $397,131.87) from status quo for NAS Lemoore, CA. 
Moving the unit to Salinas not only has a lower cost differential but has other unintended 
non-monetary benefits such as a more fluid network of parts and people by being attached 
to an HSC ISIC. Noted in our sensitivity analysis, COA 1 is the most beneficial COA with 
the efficiency of the SAR crew being increased along with the cost per flight hour 
decreasing as well. This increases the time between maintenance phases and increases the 
overall life of the aircraft as well. 
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APPENDIX. A. GENERAL INFORMATION 
This appendix contains general information that is applied to our analysis of NAS 
Lemoore. The information provided was incorporated into our COAs to determine specific 
annual cost data. 
Table 4. Flight Cost Definitions. Source: Christensen and Sciberras (2019). 
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Table 5. Facility Cost per Year. Source: Christensen and Sciberras (2019). 
Note: As we were unable to obtain facility costs at NAS Lemoore, we 
assumed facility cost would be relatively close; therefore, Whidbey Island 
data was applied to facility costs for NAS Salinas and Salinas airport. 
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The following is a RAND study conducted in 2005, which incorporates the fully 
burdened costs of an active duty service member (Dahlman, 2007). Each item was inflated 
to base year 2018 to keep costs constant across the cost comparisons. 
Table 6. RAND Study—Cost of a Military Person. Adapted from Dahlman 
(2007). 
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Table 7. RAND Study—Cost of a Military Person. Source: Christensen and 
Sciberras (2019). 
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Table 8. RAND Study—Cost of a Military Person. Source: Christensen and 
Sciberras (2019). 
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APPENDIX B. LEMOORE 
This appendix contains all background information with regard to generating each 
COA located in Table 3. 
Table 9. Lemoore Dashboard. Adapted from Christensen and 
Sciberras (2018). 
Notes: This table is a snapshot of significant values used in 
our calculations for Lemoore. All values derived from 
subsequent tables. 
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Table 10. Aircraft Costs. Adapted from Christensen and Sciberras (2018). 
Notes:MH-60S costs in 2017 were used as a base price and inflated to 2018 to normalize our data. 
S-92 pricing for the year 2017 was derived from an aircraft broker and confirmed on their 
company website (Cox, n.d.). 2017 cost was inflated to match remaining calculations for 2018. 
BELL 214ST pricing was obtained from an aircraft broker. The term SLEP’d refers to the process 
of the Navy extending the useful lifespan of a particular aircraft platform. SLEP’d costs were 
derived based on total cost of aircraft divided by the allotted SLEP’d hours. This number as then 
multiplied by the number of hours flown during the year. 
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Table 11. Active Duty Personnel Costs for Lemoore. Adapted from 
Christensen and Sciberras (2018). 
Notes: Using the FY18 pay scale, all amounts were derived by taking the average for each rank/rate based 
on the minimum and maximum time in service (TIS). 
Subsequent years were found by taking the average pay increase in both base pay and BAH from 2012–
2019 and multiplying the previous amount by this average increase. 
Column “#” indicates the number of personnel of the specific rank assigned to the SAR unit. 
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Table 12. Active Duty Personnel Costs COA 1 for Salinas, CA. 
Adapted from Christensen and Sciberras (2018). 
Using the FY18 pay scale, all amounts were derived by taking the average for each rank/rate 
based on the minimum and maximum time in service (TIS). 
Subsequent years were found by taking the average pay increase in both base pay and BAH from 
2012–2019 and multiplying the previous amount by this average increase. 
Column “#” indicates the number of personnel of the specific rank assigned to the SAR unit. 
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Table 13. NAS Lemoore Maintenance Contract. Adapted from Christensen 
and Sciberras (2019). 
Notes: Projected costs include FFP, NWD, CBA, and transition fees, and is 
based on either a) the averages monthly cost per FTE over the life span of 
the contract if the contractor pricing is unbalanced or b) the average monthly 
cost per FTE for the last period of performance if the contract pricing is 
balanced. 
3% COLA increase per year added to contract cost 
3% transition fee 
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